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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This appeal involves the lease of dairy facilities in Newton,
Utah.

The

owners

and

Lessors

of

these

facilities

and

the

Plaintiffs and Appellees in this case are Norval R. Jones and
Delores S. Jones.

Norval R. Jones and Delores S. Jones, when

referred to collectively in this brief will be referred to as
Jones.

The Jones when referred to separately will be referred to

as "Mr." and "Mrs.".

The Lessee in said Lease is the Defendant and

Appellant, Michael J. Arambel. Michael J. Arambel will be referred
to in this brief as Arambel. References to the Clerk's record will
be by the designation

"R" followed by the page in the record.

Reference to the transcript of the trial will be by the letter M T"
followed by the page and line.
otherwise noted.

All emphasis is added unless

Pivotal documents in this appeal are a Lease

between Jones as Lessors and Arambel as Lessee which was introduced
in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, (the Lease), a Contract of
Sale between Jones as Sellers and Arambel as Buyer which was
introduced in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, (the Contract),
the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision dated February 22, 1995 (R.
102), the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered April 14, 1995 which are in the record at page 108, (the
Findings of Fact), the Trial Court's Judgment and Decree entered
April 14, 1995 which is in the record at page 113, (the Judgment
and Decree), and the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision dated July
5, 1995 which is in the record at page 149, (the Second Memorandum
Decision).
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For ease of reference by this Court, in the Addendum to this
brief

are a copy of the Lease marked

Contract

marked

as

"Contract",

a

copy

"Lease", a copy of
of

the

Trial

the

Court's

Memorandum Decision marked "Mem. D e c " , a copy of the Findings of
Fact marked "F. of Fact", a copy of the Judgment and Decree marked
"J. and Decree", and a copy of the Second Memorandum

Decision

marked "Sec. Mem. Dec."

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Jurisdiction to hear this case is conferred on this Court by
78-2a-3(2) (k) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.

The Order of

the Utah Supreme Court pouring this case over to this Court is
found in R. 166.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Trial Court err in finding that Jones had a

continuing expectation that Arambel would return to the Leased
Premises?

The

erroneous".

standard

for review of this issue

is

"clearly

Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Alta

Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1992) . This issue was
preserved on appeal by Arambel raising and arguing the issue in a
Post Trial Memorandum (R. 71).
2.

Whether Jones accepted Arambel's surrender of the Leased

Premises thereby terminating the Lease? The standard for review of
this issue is "clearly erroneous".

Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, Alta Industries, supra, Wade v. Stangl, 869 P. 2d 9 (Utah

3
(Utah App. 1994) .

This issue was preserved on appeal by Arambel

raising and arguing the issue in a Post Trial Memorandum (R. 71) .
3.
accepted

Whether the Trial Court's finding that Jones had not
surrender

of

the

Leased

Premises

was

correct?

The

standard for review of this issue is "clearly erroneous".

Rule

52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Alta Industries, supra, and
State of Utah v. Jose Carlos Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) . This
issue was preserved on appeal by Arambel raising and arguing the
issue in a Post Trial Memorandum (R. 71) .
4.

Whether, under the facts of this case the Trial Court

erred in finding that a reasonable time for Jones to mitigate their
damage was one (1) year?
correctness.

The standard for review of this issue is

United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co.,

870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993).

This issue was preserved on appeal by

Arambel raising and arguing the issue in a Post Trial Memorandum R.
71) .
5.

Whether the Trial Court erred in awarding Jones their

attorney's fees and whether this Court should award Jones their
attorney's fees in this appeal?
issue is correctness.
Aetna

Casualty

The standard for review of this

United Park City Mines, supra, Andreason v.

& Surety

Co., 848 P.2d

171

(Utah App.

1993) .

Arambel preserved this issue on appeal by raising it in a Post
Trial Memorandum (R. 71).
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APPLICABLE RULE
The Rule of procedure having application in this case is "Rule
52 (a) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides

as

follows:
"Rule 52.

Findings by the court.

(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law ther€>on, and judgment shall be entered
pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute
the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not
necessary for purposes of review.
Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses . . . "
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Judgment of the Trial Court on Jones
action to enforce the provisions of a Lease of dairy facilities in
Newton, Utah between Jones as Lessors and Arambel as Lessee.
Lease ran from September 1, L989 through August 31, 1994.

The

Arambel

moved his cows off the Leased Premises in August of 1991, ceased
making payments on the Lease in July of 1992 but continued to
occupy the Leased Premises, at least in part, until December of

When Arambel ceased making payments on the Lease, Jones sued
him for delinquent rental payments of $1,600.00 per month and for
damages beyond reasonable wear to the Leased Premises.

(R. 3, 4

and 31) . Arambel defended on the grounds that Jones had accepted
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surrender of the Leased Premises and thereby released Arambel from
the Lease and also that Jones had failed to mitigate their damages.
The case was tried to the Honorable Ben Hadfield who held the
Lease had not been terminated and that Jones had a right to collect
rental payments

for a period of one

(1) year from July, 1992

through June of 1993, less mitigating offsets of $3,650.00, plus
interest, damages to the Leased Premises and reasonable attorney's
fees.

After Arambel's motion to alter or amend the Findings of

Fact and Judgment and Decree of the Court were denied, Arambel
brought this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Arambel's
therefore

Brief

restate

omits

the

facts

several

material

facts

and

Jones

for the purpose of including

all

relevant facts.
Mr. Jones had been a dairy farmer for his entire life until
August of 1989 when Jones entered into a Lease of their dairy
facilities in Newton, Utah to Arambel.

(T. p. 16 Is. 18-20 and the

Lease) .
The Jones own agricultural property other than the dairy
facilities they leased to Arambel which Mr. Jones continued to farm
after and Arambel Jones entered into the Lease.
25 and p. 20 Is. 1-13).

(T. p. 19 Is. 14,

It was contemplated when the parties

entered into the Lease that the alfalfa and barley produced by the
Jones on their other property would be available to Arambel to feed
to his dairy cows.

To this end, the hay produced by Jones was
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placed in barns and the haylage was placed in a pit on the Leased
Premises and purchased and used from these facilities by Arambel.
(T. p. 20 Is. 3-13) .
The term of the Lease was five (5) years from September 1,
1989 until August 31, 1994 arid the monthly rental under the Lease
was $1,600.00 per month beginning October 1, 1989 and

running

through and including September 1, 1994 (Lease, paragraphs 2 and
4) .

Concurrent with the Lease, the Jones entered into a Contract

of Sale to sell their cows to Arambel (the Contract) . The purchase
price on the Contract of Sale was $207,600.00, payable $4,750.00 on
the 15th of each month beginning October 15, 1989.

(Contract,

paragraph 5 ) .
The Contract provided, among other things, as follows:
"17. Concurrent
Lease. Concurrent
with
the
execution and delivery of this Contract, the Seller as
Lessor and the Buyer as Lessee will enter into a written
Lease (the "Lease") of property and improvements in
Newton, Utah whereon the cows are presently being housed
and kept.
The Lease is an integral part of this
transaction whereby the cows and the base are being sold
to Buyer.
It is, therefore, expressly understood and
agreed that any default on the Lease will constitute a
default on this Contract, and any such default on the
Lease shall make available to Seller all remedies on
default provided in this Contract as well as and in
addition to all remedies provided in the Lease upon the
default of the Lessee."
The Lease contains the following reciprocal provision:
"12. A default on the Contract shall constitute a
default on this Lease and shall make available to Lessor
all remedies on default provided in the Contract and in
this Lease."
The Lease also required in paragraph 3 thereof that Arambel
keep the cows on the leased property at all times during the term
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of the Lease and at no other location until the Contract and the
Lease were completely performed by Arambel.

Further, the Lease

provided in paragraph 6, that:
"Lessee agrees to care for and to maintain all of
the improvements constituting a part of the leased
premises and all equipment constituting a part of the
leased premises in their condition as at the beginning of
this Lease, reasonable wear accepted. Lessee covenants
and agrees to promptly repair in a workmanlike manner all
damage to improvements and all equipment constituting a
part of the leased premises at Lessee's sole cost and
expense."
The Lease provided that the parties would cooperate in manure
removal from the Leased Premises and that manure produced by the
cows would be applied to land owned by Jones unless the Jones
otherwise directed.

(Lease, paragraph 10) .

The Contract also provided that Arambel could not prepay any
part of the purchase price without the prior written consent of the
Jones and then only on such terms and conditions as Jones may
specify in writing in advance of any permitted payment.

(Lease,

paragraph 6 ) .
Mr. Jones testified that he would not have made the sale of
the cows without the Lease.
testified likewise.

(T. p. 18 Is. 20-22).

Mrs. Jones

(T. p. 168 Is. 7-25).

After the Lease and Contract were signed, Arambel went into
possession of the Leased Premises.

Mr. Jones proceeded to produce

feed which he placed in the hay barn and haylage bunker on the
leased property and Arambel purchased the hay and haylage thus
produced by Jones.

(T. pgs. 23, 24, 25 and 26) . The last haylage

Jones placed in the haylage silo on the leased property and sold to
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Arambel was removed by Arambel in December of 1992.

(T. p. 2 6 Is.

6-8) .
In June or July of 1991, Arambel approached Jones about paying
off the Contract and moving the cows off the leased property.

(T.

p. 26 Is. 9-25 and p. 27 Is. 1-10) . The parties ultimately agreed
that the Contract could be paid off for $155,800.00 in August of
1991.

Had the Contract continued according to its terms, the Jones

would

have

received

a

total

of

$175,627.00

from

Arambel.

(Contract, Exhibit 2, paragraiph 4(a)).
At the time the parties negotiated for the payoff of the
Contract, they also discussed the continuation of the Lease.

Mr.

Jones told Arambel that it was imperative that the Lease Agreement
continue even if the cows were moved.

Jones asked Arambel how he

could pay the Lease if he moveid the cows and Arambel stated that if
he moved his cows to another operation where he was already milking
cows, it would be more efficient for him having the cows in one
place and that he could make that up.
30 Is. 1-5).

(T. p. 29 Is. 12-25 and p.

Mr. Jones testified:

"Q. Okay. So the totality of the agreement for the
payoff of the cows was that he would pay you $155,800.00.
Is that correct?"
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And that he would continue to pay the Lease to its

A.

That's correct.

term?

(T. p. 30 Is. 17-23).

Mr. Jones further testified that he would

not have all allowed the cow Contract to be paid off and the cows
removed from the Leased Premises if he had not had Arambel's firm
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agreement to continue the Lease.

(T. p. 31 Is. 9-14).

Mrs. Jones

testified "It was the one thing I kept stressing that he had to
keep paying the lease arrangement because that was the income we
were planning on using" and that she would not have permitted the
Contract be paid off and the cows moved off the Leased Premises if
the Lease was not going to continue (T. p. 168 Is. 15-21).
After Arambel paid off the Contract, he continued to pay the
Lease until June of 1992 at which time he ceased lease payments.
(T. p. 12 Is. 12-21).
Although Arambel moved his cows from the Leased Premises in
August of 1991, he continued to use the silage pit on the Leased
Premises for the storage of haylage until December of 1992 (T. p.
25 Is. 12-20)

and his tenant vacated

the home

in October or

November of 1992 (T. pgs. 47 and 48). After Arambel had removed
his cows, haylage and tenant, Jones continued to keep the premises
available for Arambel to use after December, 1992.

(T. p. 42 Is.

3-5) .
Prior to the time that Arambel vacated the property, Jones and
Arambel used each other's equipment for manure removal (T. pgs. 37
and 38), Jones allowed Arambel to use other corals not subject to
the Lease free of charge from the summer of 1990 to August or
September of 1991 (T. p. 36 Is. 11-21), and Arambel used Jones'
shop and equipment to repair his machinery (T. p. 232 Is. 24-25 and
p. 233) . The parties generally reciprocated in use of each others
equipment (T. p. 37 Is. 16 and 17).
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After Arambel vacated the Leased Premises, Jones had three (3)
opportunities

to

lease

the property

for short periods

of

time.

Because Arambel had agreed as a part of the payoff of the Lease to
continue leasing the property until the end of its term, Mr. Jones
did not consider that he had any authority to let the property to
anyone else.
three

(T. p. 107 Is. 8-15).

In any event, none of

the

(3) parties who contacted Jones were acceptable tenants to

Jones had he been in a position to lease the property.

One tenant

was Todd Davis, who just wanted to milk cows on the property until
he

sold

them,

the

second

was a person named Goodyear

wanted the property for five

who

just

(5) or six (6) months, and the other

was a person who wanted Jones to carry him for a period of time.
For these reasons, none of these tenants were acceptable to Jones.
(T. pgs. 106-109) .
This

litigation

ensued

when

Arambel

payments after the June, 1992 payment.
take any action to terminate the Lease.

ceased

making

lease

However, Jones never did
They always considered the

Lease to be in full force and effect and their suit was to recover
payments due on the Lease until its termination and for damages
caused by Arambel to the Leased Premises.
and Amendment, R. 3, 4 and 31) .
costs and attorney's fees
After Arambel's

(Plaintiff's Complaint

The Lease provides for payment of

(Lease, paragraph 1 9 ) .

tenant moved out of the home on the

Leased

Premises in October or November of 1992, Jones sold the home for
$45,000.00

(T. p. 58 Is. 3 - 7 ) .

The portion of the selling price

allocated to the home was $30,000.00

(T. p. 58 Is. 11-12).

The
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sale occurred in May of 1993 (T. p. 101 Is. 15-18) . Two (2) of the
tractors leased by Arambel were inoperable when Arambel moved his
cattle from the Leased Premises. Contrary to the provisions of the
Lease,

Arambel

never

repaired

these

items

of

equipment

and

ultimately Jones traded them in on new equipment which, Jones
testified, could have been used by Arambel at his option.

(T. p.

159 Is. 16-25) .
After Arambel vacated the Leased Premises, Jones kept twentysix (26) head of heifers in a corral on the Leased Premises.
Jones testified

that he did so pursuant

to an agreement

Mr.
with

Arambel (T. pgs. 39-40), and that he placed hay in the barn as he
had done in the first years of the Lease for purchase and use by
Arambel should Arambel so elect.
The Trial Court found that the Lease had never been terminated
(Finding of Fact No. 6 ) , and that Arambel had defaulted on
Lease by failure

the

to pay the monthly payments and to keep the

improvements on the premises in good order (Finding of Fact No. 7) .
The Court found that Arambel was obligated on the Lease for one (1)
year after he quit making payments, making a total of $19,200.00
plus interest due on the Lease for that year and that Arambel had
damaged the Leased Premises beyond normal wear to the extent of
$5,980.00 plus interest (Findings of Fact No's. 10 and 11).

The

Court also found that the Jones had a continuing expectation that
Arambel would return to and use the Leased Premises and for this
reason did not relet the premises and that that expectation on the
Jones part was reasonable but not for a period exceeding one (1)

12
year from the date of the initial breach (Findings of Fact No. 9) .
In its Second Memorandum Decision the Court held that reasonable
mitigation

efforts by Jones should have produced

lessee within one

an alternate

(1) year from the breach and that the breach

occurred on July 1 of 1992.

(Second Memorandum Decision).

That Arambel damaged the Leased Premises beyond normal use is
apparently not contested by Arambel and Arambel does not, in his
Brief, contest these damages as found by the Trial Court.

Indeed,

in the Conclusion to his Brief, Arambel asks that the Judgment of
the Court be reduced to the amount of these damages.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

In Point I of his brief, Arambel challenges the finding

of the Court as being not supported by the evidence.

Jones'

argument on the point is that in order to challenge a finding of
the Trial Court, the party making the challenge must marshall the
evidence supporting the finding and then show that the evidence as
marshalled does not support the finding and that the finding is
therefor

"clearly erroneous."

Because Arambel has not met the

marshalling requirement, his attack on the Court's finding must
fail and the finding be affirmed by this Court.
2.

In Point

II of his brief, Arambel argues that Jones

elected to accept his surrender of the Leased Premises, thereby
terminating the Lease.

Jones' arguments on this point are that

Jones did not elect to accept Arambel's surrender of the Leased
Premises but rather treated the Lease as a continuing obligation
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and sued for performance of the Lease.

The Court found the Lease

had not been terminated and there was evidence supporting the
finding the Lease had not been terminated.

Arambel failed to

marshall the evidence in support of this finding of the Court and
to show the finding was "clearly erroneous."

For these reasons the

Trial Court's finding that the Lease had not been terminated was
not "clearly erroneous."
3.

In Point III of his brief, Arambel argues that the Trial

Court erred in not finding that Jones elected to accept Arambel's
surrender of the Leased Premises. Jones' argument on this point is
that whether there is an acceptance by a lessor of a lessees
surrender of leased premises is a question of fact, that in making
a finding of fact the Court has broad discretion and those findings
should be upheld absent a showing they were "clearly erroneous."
By finding that the Lease had never been terminated, the Court
found Jones had not elected, either expressly or by a course of
conduct, to accept Arambel's surrender of the Leased Premises.
Arambel has failed to meet the marshalling requirement and shown
that the Court's finding the Lease had not been terminated was
"clearly erroneous."
4.

In Point IV of his brief, Arambel argues that Jones had

a duty to mitigate his damages under Reid v. Mutual of Omaha
Insurance Company, 776 P.2d 896

(Utah 1989).

The arguments of

Jones on this are that that duty to mitigate did not arise when
Arambel ceased making Lease payments in July of 19 92 under the
particular facts of this case.

Further, that even if that duty did
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arise, Jones took reasonable action to mitigate their damages and
that the Court's finding that this obligation to mitigate arose
after one (1) year from the date of the original breach was, under
the facts of this case, reasonable.
5.
not

In Point V of his brief, Arambel argues that Jones are

entitled

to

attorney's

fees because

Arambel

successfully

defended Jones claim by Arambel's defense of failure by Jones to
mitigate their damages.

The argument of Jones on this point is

that Arambel did not prove his defense of Jones' claims, either in
the Trial Court or, for the reasons cited in Arguments I through IV
of this brief, before this Court; that therefore
finding

the

Lease

was

not

terminated

is

this

correct,

Court's

the

lease

provision for attorney's fees applies and the Court's award of
attorney's fees to Jones is also correct.

Further, that Jones

should be awarded their attorney's fees on this appeal and the case
should be remanded to the Trial Court to fix the amount of those
fees.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ARAMBEL'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR
BY ENTERING FINDINGS OF FACT NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE MUST FAIL BY REASON OF ARAMBEL'S FAILURE TO
MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF SAID FINDINGS OF FACT
AND THEN SHOWING THE QUESTIONED FINDINGS WERE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS.
Under Point I of his brief, Arambel attacks the Trial Court's
Finding of Fact No. 9 that Jones "... had a continuing expectation
that Defendant would return to the leased premises."
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When challenging a finding of fact made by a trial court,
appellate

courts

will

not

address

appellant

has properly marshalled

the

challenge

the evidence

unless

the

supporting

the

finding and shown that the finding is so lacking in support that it
is clearly erroneous.
1989).

Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P. 2d 1176

(Utah

In the case of Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut.

App. 1993) the Court, citing Grayson Roper Ltd, v. Finlinson, 782
P.2d at 467 (Utah 1989) stated:
"As a prerequisite to an appellant's attack on
findings of fact, appellant must marshall all evidence in
support of the findings and demonstrate "That the
evidence, including all reasonable inference drawn
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings...."
And in the case of Wade v. Stangl, 869 P. 2d 9,

(Utah App.

1994), this court held that in order to successfully challenge a
trial courts findings of fact an appellant must marshall evidence
in support of the finding and then demonstrate that despite the
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as
to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them
clearly erroneous.
Arambel has not met this marshalling requirement.

In order to

meet this burden, Arambel must first list all evidence supporting
the finding that is challenged.
P. 2d 1282 (Utah 1993) .

Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846

Arambel has failed to do this.

Rather,

Arambel sites to the Court (without citation to the record) facts
favorable to his view of the evidence which tend to show the
questioned finding is not supported by the evidence.
set forth in support of the questioned finding.

No facts are
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If an appellant

fails to properly marshall

the evidence,

appellate courts must assume the findings are correct. Alta Indus.
Ltd v. Hurst, supra.
Because Arambel failed to marshall the evidence in support of
Finding of Fact No. 7, his attack on that Finding must fail and the
Finding be affirmed by this Court.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE JONES DID NOT
ELECT TO ACCEPT THE APPELLANT'S SURRENDER OF THE LEASED
PREMISES AND THEREBY TERMINATE THE LEASE.
Assuming arguendo that Arambel ever surrendered the Leased
Premises to Jones, the earliest that surrender occurred was in
December of 1992.

Arambel moved his cows off the Leased Premises

in August or September of 1991 (T. p. 31 Is. 15-20).
moved

out

of

the house

on the Leased Premises

November of 1992 (T. p. 52 Is. 17-22).

His tenant

in October

or

Arambel moved the last of

his haylage from the Leased Premises in December of 1992 (T. p. 25
Is. 12-20).
These acts of Arambel in removing cattle, tenants and haylage
from the Leased Premises do not prove a surrender of the Leased
Premises.

Rather they show a continuing intent by Arambel to

retain the Leased Premises over a period of at lease six (6) months
after he quit making Lease payments.

The Trial Court found that

Jones always had the expectation that Arambel would return to the
Leased Premises and that this expectation was reasonable (Findings
of Fact No. 9) .

The Court had evidence in the form of Mr. Jones'
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testimony, which the Court obviously chose to believe, in support
of this Finding.

Mr. Jones testified:

Q.
All right. And when did you realize that Mr.
Arambel had left the premises and was not intendent (sic)
of coming back?
A.
I contend that he could have come back at any
time and used those premises. I had -- That's why I kept
the, I did not let any other person in or was not
interested in leasing it.
Q.
When did you realize though that Mr. Arambel
abandoned those premises?
A.
I didn't think he -- It was his right to keep
those premises until '94.
He moved his cows in
September. He kept dry cows there for a period of time
and he couldn't make the dry cows and other things that
he was going to do with the premises work so he removed
the dry cows after October or November.
Q.
When you did not receive payment in July of
1992, was it at that point that you believe that Mr.
Arambel had abandoned the premises?
A.
I have never thought that Mr. Arambel had
abandoned the premises. He had a right to come back to
those premises at any time and use them for whatever
purpose he wanted to.
(T. p. 88 Is. 22-25 and T. p. 89 Is. 1-19.)
More

importantly,

Jones

Contract before its maturity.

allowed

Arambel

to

pay

off

the

The inducement for Jones to allow

this premature pay off was Arambel's promise to continue the Lease
in effect.
Q.
lease?

Mr. Jones testified:
Anything said in this conversation about the

A.
And when we were talking about this I said, I
stated that he realized that it was imperative that the
lease agreement would continue even if he moved the cows.
And I stated at that time how, or I asked him how he
figured, how he calculated that he could pay a lease
agreement with not receiving any value from it, not
having any livestock or making use of the barns or
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anything. And he said well, it's more efficient for him
to have the cows in one place and be able to do that, he
can make that up. And so that he could make that up
better than to have them in two places. And I said well,
no matter what I have to receive the lease payment on
that leased property because it was included in it and if
you want to move the, if you want to remove the cows, the
lease agreement has to continue. And he agreed to that.
T. p. 29 Is. 12-25 and T. p. 30 Is. 1-5.
And Mrs. Jones testified:
"Q. You were awarei that as part of the negotiations
for the payoff of the cows and the right to remove the
cows, the lease was to continue, the payments on the
lease agreement?
A.

Yes.

Q.
And was that arrangement inducement or one of
the inducements to you to allow the cows to be paid off
and moved?
A.
It was the one thing that I kept stressing that
he had to keep paying the lease arrangement because that
was the income that we were planning on using.
Q.
Would you have permitted the cows to be paid
off and moved off the premises if the lease was not going
to continue and had been cancelled?
A.

Never, no.

These three (3) items from the Jones' testimony gave the Trial
Court a basis for its finding that "... Plaintiffs had a continuing
expectation that Defendant would return to and use the leased
premises ..." and that "... This expectation on the Plaintiff's
part was reasonable ..."
Arambel

quotes

from

(Finding of Fact No. 9) .
the default

clause

(Lease, paragraph

17(b)) (see page 17 of Arambel brief) wherein two (2) alternative
remedies on default are set forth.
Lease.

There

is

no

evidence

The first was to terminate the

that

Jones

took

any

action

to
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terminate the Lease and the Court expressly found that "... the
lease is valid and enforceable and has never been terminated or
modified by the parties, either specifically or by a course of
dealincr between Plaintiff and Defendant."
The second

(Finding of Fact No. 6) .

remedy cited by Arambel

is for Jones to take

possession of the Leased Premises and relet the same.
evidence

that

Jones

exercised

this

option.

There is no

Rather,

Jones

considered the Lease in effect and sued to collect the payments
thereon (see Plaintiff's Complaint and Amendment, R. 3, 4 and 31) .
In other words, Appellees elected to specifically enforce

the

Lease, a remedy available to Jones under the laws of the State of
Utah.

In this regard, Jones point out to the Court that Arambel

selectively quoted from the default clause in the Lease and omitted
the following provision in the same clause:
"The foregoing remedy is not exclusive, and Lessor
shall have as remedies cumulative to those provided above
any and all remedies against Lessee provided by the laws
of the State of Utah."
(Lease, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1,
paragraph 17.)
The

contention

Plaintiffs/Appellees

at

page

elected
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of

Arambel's

to take possession

of

brief
the

that
Leased

Premises and relet the same, is not supported by the record and is
contrary to the express finding of the Trial Court and should be
rejected by this Court.
Without repeating the argument in Point I of this Brief, the
argument thereon marshalling the evidence applies to Arambel's
attack

on

terminated

the

Court's

finding

that

the Lease

had

never

been

"... either specifically of by a course of dealing
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between

Plaintiff

and

Defendant."

(Finding

of

Fact

No. 6 ) .

Arambel never marshalled the evidence in support of the finding
that the Lease had not been terminated at all.

He is required to

do this and then show that notwithstanding the evidence in support
of the finding the finding is clearly erroneous.

Wade, supra.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT JONES DID NOT ACCEPT
ARAMBEL'S SURRENDER OF THE LEASED PREMISES AND WITHOUT
SUCH ACCEPTANCE, THE LEASE IS NOT TERMINATED.
In the case of John C. Cutler Association v. De Jay Stores,
279 P. 2d 700

(Ut. 1955), the Utah Supreme Court held

(1) where

there is no express agreement to abandon a lease the Tenant has
the burden of establishing as an affirmative defense that such
agreement was implied by the conduct of the parties, (2)

a lease

may be deemed surrendered only when the landlord exercises dominion
over the leased premises which is inconsistent with the rights of
the tenant, and
whether

the

(3)

landlord

where a tenant surrenders leased premises
accepbs

the

surrender

is

a

question

of

intention to be determined from all the attendant circumstances,
including conduct and intention of the parties.
Arambel did not prove that Jones exercised dominion over the
Leased Premises which was inconsistent with the rights of Arambel
in the Leased Premises.

In fact, any use of the Leased Premises by

Jones was not adverse to Arambel's rights and was consistent (1)
with the express agreement with Arambel for Jones to place heifers
in a corral on the Leased Premises (T. pgs. 39-40); and (2) with
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the past course of dealing between Jones and Arambel in mutual use
of facilities, equipment and tools (T. p. 36 Is. 11-21, pgs. 37-38
and p. 232 Is. 24-25 and p. 233).
Premises

was

consistent

with

the

Jones' use of the Leased
historic

joint

use

of

the

facilities and Jones made it clear that the Leased Premises were
available to Arambel at all times (T. p. 89 Is. 1-19).
The exercise of dominion such as would constitute acknowledgment by Jones that Arambel had surrendered and Jones had accepted
surrender of the Leased Premises was clearly a question of fact and
in making a finding of fact the discretion of the Trial Court is
broad

and

erroneous.

should

be

upheld

absent

a

showing

it

was

clearly

In order to assail this finding by the Trial Court,

Arambel has the burden of showing the finding was clearly erroneous
(Rule 52 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and State of Utah v. Jose
Carlos Pena, 869 P.2d 932

(Utah 1994).

Rule 52(a) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part that "... finding of
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the Trial Court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses. "

And in Pena, supra, the court held that the

clearly erroneous standard is highly deferential to, the trial
court's discretion because the witnesses and parties appear before
the trial court and the evidence is presented there.
Arambel has not marshalled any evidence in support of the
Court's finding the Leased Premises had not been surrendered, much
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less proved that that evidence shows the Court's finding to be
clearly erroneous.
The Trial Court found that the Lease had never been terminated
(Finding of Fact No. 6) . Aranabel contends there were acts of Jones
which demonstrated that Jones accepted the surrender of the Leased
Premises and recited six (6) of those acts on pages 22 and 23 of
his brief.

However, the Trial Court rather than viewing the Jones

acts as accepting the surrender of the Leased Premises viewed them
as acts mitigating damages.

The Court made this assessment after

hearing the testimony and observing the witnesses.

It was within

the Court's discretion to make these findings and the findings
should not be disturbed absent a showing by Arambel that they were
clearly erroneous.

No such showing has been made by Arambel.

It is significant that Arambel makes no citation to the record
of evidence to support his contention of Jones exercising dominion
over the Leased Premises.
found

in its Memorandum

On the other hand, the Court expressly
Decision that Jones' action

in using

corrals and the hay barn and selling the home was to mitigate their
damages (see Memorandum Decision).
In

addition,

Arambel

has not marshalled

the

evidence

in

support of the Court's finding that any exercise of dominion over
the Leased Premises by Jones was to mitigate damage and were not
inconsistent with Arambel's use of the Property.
While Arambel surrendered the Leased Premises in December of
1992, it is clear that Jones never intended to or did accept that
surrender.

Under Cutler, supra, Arambel had the burden of proving
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acceptance of his surrender of the Leased Premises, and of proving
Lessee exercised dominion over the Leased Premises inconsistent
with a right as a tenant.
carry this burden.

As pointed out above, Arambel did not

On the other hand, the finding by the Trial

Court that the Lease had never been terminated was supported by
substantial

evidence, was not clearly erroneous and should be

affirmed by this Court.
It is noted parenthetically that Arambel has taken inconsistent position on the issue of whether the Lease was terminated
before its expiration.

On the one hand, Arambel does not contest

that Jones were entitled to recover for damages to the Leased
Premises (a right they could only have if the Lease had not been
terminated).

On the other hand, Arambel contends that the claimed

surrender and acceptance of surrender by Jones terminated the Lease
and Jones are not therefore entitled to lease payments.
cannot have it both ways.
was not.
damage

Arambel

Either the Lease was terminated or it

If it was not terminated so as to allow compensation for

to the Leased

Premises, it was not terminated

for the

purpose of collecting delinquent Lease payments.

POINT IV
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING
THAT JONES' EXPECTATION THAT ARAMBEL WOULD RETURN TO THE
LEASED PREMISES WAS REASONABLE BUT NOT FOR A PERIOD OF
ONE (1) YEAR FROM THE INITIAL BREACH BY ARAMBEL WAS
CORRECT AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
The following facts are central to the Court's findings in
this case:
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1.

Though Arambel stopped making lease payments after the

June, 1992 payment, he continued to occupy the Leased Premises
until he removed the last of this haylage in December, 1992.

(T.

p. 25 Is. 12-20) .
2.

The right of Arambel to pay off the Contract and remove

the cows from the Leased Premises was expressly conditioned upon
the Lease continuing for its term and but for Arambel's agreement
to continue the Lease, Jones would not have allowed Arambel to pay
off the Contract and move the cows.

(T. p. 29 Is. 12-25, p. 30

Is., 1-5, T. p. 31 Is. 9-14 and T. p. 168 Is. 7-22).
3.

Arambel

was

milking

cows

at

another

location

and

consolidating his milking operations at one site was an economic
advantage

to

Arambel

such

that

he

considered

it

was

continuing paying lease payments to obtain that advantage.

worth
(T. p.

29 Is. 12-25 and p. 30 Is 1-5).
4.

By

allowing

Arambel

to

prepay

the

Contract,

Jones

suffered an economic disadvantage in the form of receiving less
money

on

the

Contract

Contract gone to term.

than

they would

have

received

had

the

A material inducement to Jones to accept

this economic disadvantage was (1) accommodation of Arambel; and
(2)

the

assurance

that

if

prepayment

of

permitted, the Lease would continue to term.

the

Contract

were

(T. p. 31 Is. 9-14).

Taking into account the foregoing, the Trial Court found that
Jones "... had a continuing expectation that Defendant

(Arambel)

would return to and use the Leased Premises and for this reason
failed to relet the Premises and thereby mitigating their damages."
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However,

the

reasonable,

court

added

that

although

have

been

reasonable

it would

the

expectation

for Jones

to

was
find

alternate ways of mitigating their damages after one (1) year from
the initial breach.

(Finding of Fact No. 9) . The Court found the

initial breach consistent of failure to make lease payments for
July, 1992 and thereafter

and computed the damages to be the

monthly payments of $1,600.00 times the one
arrive at total damages of $19,200.00.

(1) year period to

(Finding of Fact No. 10).

The Court did find that Jones had taken steps to mitigate their
damages during said one (1) year period and found the mitigating
efforts to total $3,650.00.

(Finding of Fact No. 8 ) .

From this

Finding, the Court subtracted $3,650.00 from $19,200.00 and entered
judgment for the $15,550.00 plus interest.
paragraph 1).

(Judgment and Decree,

The Court also found Arambel had damaged the Leased

Premises beyond reasonable wear and awarded judgment on this count
for $5,980.00.

(Finding of Fact No.'s 7 and 11 and Judgment and

Decree, paragraph 2 ) .
Arambel cites Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, 776
P. 2d 896, in support of his contention that Jones had a duty to
mitigate their damages.
RejLd, supra.

Jones do not take issue with the rule of

They submit that the facts of this case take it out

of the strict application of that Rule.
commercial lease.

The Reid case involved a

This case involves an agricultural lease with

decidedly different facts.

Specifically, the four (4) facts cited

above and the fact that we are here dealing with agricultural
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property.

In Reid, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged there could

be difference.

It stated:

"Obviously, the objective commercial reasonableness
of mitigation efforts is a fact question that depends
heavily on the particulars of the property and the
relevant market at the pertinent point in time."
Id.
907.
To impose on Jones a strict duty to mitigate is to allow
Arambel to benefit from misleading Jones into allowing a pay off of
the Contract, allowing Arambel

to move his cows,

reaping

the

benefit of moving the cows and then walking away from the Lease.
Clearly, Jones expected the Lease to continue to term. Arambel had
so represented and agreed as a condition which he understood and
agreed to of his right to prepay the Contract.
It should be equally cle>.ar that Jones should have no duty to
mitigate

their

premises.

damages

until Arambel

had

finally vacated

the

This was in December of 1992 when he removed the last of

his haylage from the Leased Premises.

This was six

(6) months

after Arambel quit making lease payments.
Jones did mitigate their damages to the extent of $3,650.00
(Finding of Fact No. 8 ) , and the Court deducted this amount from
the one

(1) years payments it found Arambel should pay.

It is

significant that the pay off received by Jones was $19,827.00 less
than what Jones would have received on the Contract had it gone
full term.

And this amount is virtually equal to the one

(1)

year's lease payments the Court held Jones were entitled to.
The foregoing facts auger against a finding that Jones should
have begun efforts to relet the Leased Premises in July of 1992 and
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in favor of the Trial Court's finding that a reasonable time when
efforts should have yielded a replacement tenant was one (1) year
after the last lease payment was made.

For these reasons, the

Jones submit that Reid, supra, should be factually distinguished in
this case and the Finding and Decree of the Trial Court affirmed.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED JONES THEIR ATTORNEY
FEES AND THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD JONES ATTORNEY FEES FOR
THIS APPEAL.
The Lease requires Arambel to pay $1,600.0 0 per month on the
1st day of each month

(Lease, paragraph 4) and to maintain the

Leased Premises in their condition as at the beginning of the
Lease, reasonable wear excepted (Lease, paragraph 6 ) .

The Court

found that Arambel had breached both of these Lease provisions, the
first by failing to make lease payments after June of 1992 and the
second by failing to care for and maintain the improvements on the
Leased Premises.

(Finding of Fact No. 7 ) . The Trial Court found

the Lease had never been terminated.

(Finding of Fact No. 6 ) .

This Finding has not been successfully assailed by Arambel on this
appeal for the reasons argued under Points I, II and III in this
brief.
While Jones had the option to terminate the Lease, they never
elected that option.

Terminating the Lease was not Jones' only

remedy on Arambel's default.

The Lease provides for the remedy of

termination and then states:
f,

shall

The foregoing remedy is not exclusive, and Lessor
have as remedies cumulative to those provided
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above, any and all remedies against Lessee provided by
the laws of the State of Utah."
(Lease, paragraph 17,
last sentence).
Jones elected the remedy of specific performance and sued for
lease

payments

due

and

for

damages

to

the

Leased

Premises.

(Plaintiff's Complaint and Amendment, R. 3, 4 and 31) . This remedy
is clearly available to Jones under the laws of the State of Utah
and was therefore a remedy provided for in the Lease.
Paragraph 19 of the Lease states:
"19. Attorney's Fees and Costs. That should either
of the parties default in any of the covenants or
agreements contained herein, the defaulting party shall
pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable
attorney's fee which may arise or accrue from enforcing
this Agreement or in obtaining possession of the leased
premises or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or
by the laws of the State of Utah, whether such remedy is
pursued by filing of suit or otherwise."
Because the Lease was never terminated, Plaintiff's action was
to enforce

its provisions.

available remedy to Jones.

Enforcement

of

the Lease

was

an

The Lease provides for payment of

attorney's fees, the Trial Court correctly held Jones were entitled
to recover their attorney's fees.

Arambel does not contest the

amount of the attorney's fees and the award of attorney's fees in
the amount of $5,305.23 should be affirmed.

(Judgment and Decree,

paragraph 3 ) .
Jones' have been required to defend this appeal.

The appeal

arises from Jones' effort to enforce the Lease and under the terms
of the Lease, Jones' are entitled to recover their attorney's fees
for defending Arambel's appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The Judgment of the Trial Court in the amount of $19,200.00
for

delinquent

affirmed.

rent,

offset

by

Jones'

mitigation

should

be

That Judgment is supported by the evidence. Arambel has

not marshalled the evidence in favor of the findings on which that
judgment is buttressed and shown they were clearly erroneous.

In

addition, under the facts of this case, the Court's holding that
Jones' duty to mitigate did not arise until after July of 1993 is
fair and reasonable and results only in partially

compensating

Jones for their loss resulting from allowing Arambel to prepay the
Contract.

The Judgment in the amount of $5,980.00 plus interest

for damage to the Leased Premises has not been contested and should
be affirmed.
on other
affirmed.

If the Court affirms the Judgment of the Trial Court

counts,

its

Likewise,

judgment
if

the

for attorney's

Judgment

of

the

fees

should

be

Trial

Court

is

affirmed, this Court should award Jones their attorney's fees for
this appeal and remand to the District Court to determine the
amount of such judgment.

DATED this 12th day of August, 1996.
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
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Addendum

Lease

Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1

LEASE
THIS LEASE AGREEMENT, made and entered into on the 21st day
of August, 1989, by and between NORVAL R. JONES and DELORES S.
JONES of Newton, Cache County, Utah, hereinafter referred to as
Lessor, and MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL of North Logan, Cache County, Utah,
hereinafter referred to as Lessee,
WITNESSETH:
1. Leased Premises. The Lessor, for the term and upon the
provisions and conditions hereinafter set forth, hereby leases to
the Lessee, and the Lessee, on said provisions and conditions and
for said term, hereby leases from the Lessor, the milking parlor,
milking equipment therein, two (2) hay sheds, milk cow lounging
sheds, corrals, silo, commodity shed and tenant house situated upon
the real property in Newton, Utah described as follows:
Lots 1 and 2, Block 14, as platted on Plat "A" of Newton
Townsite Survey, and further described as being situated
in Sections 18 and 19, Township 13 North, Range 1 West
of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
including the real property on which the aforesaid improvements are
situated, the real property adjacent to said improvements which are
used in connection with said facilities, the right by means
established as of the date of this Lease of ingress and egress to
said facilities, and the following farm machinery
One
One
One
One
One

(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)

A26 International Tractor with Feed Wagon;
Ford 545 Tractor with Scraper and Loader;
Gehl Grain Chopper;
Ford Truck with Manure Box; and
Knight Manure Spreader.

The property subject of this Lease will be referred to hereafter
as the -leased premises H .
2. Term. The term of this Lease shall be five (5) years,
beginning September 1, 1989 and terminating at midnight on August
31, 1994.
3. Use of Leased Premises. Concurrent with the execution and
delivery of this Agreement, the Lessor as Seller is entering into
a Contract of Sale ("the Contract") for the sale of 180 Cows (Mthe
Cows H ) and 6900 pounds of Grade A Milk Base ("the Base") in Western
Dairymans Cooperative, Inc. (MWDCIH) to Lessee as Buyer.
It is
expressly agreed that Lessee will keep the Cows on the property
constituting a part of the leased premises at all times during the
term of this Agreement and at no other location until the Contract
and this Lease are completely performed by Lessee. Lessee further
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covenants and agrees to use and maintain the leased premises and
the Cows and Base as an integrated Grade A dairy facility during
the term of this Lease and for no other purpose. To this end,
Lessee agrees to comply with every rule and regulation applicable
to Grade A dairy facilities in Cache County, Utah.
4. Consideration. Lessee agrees to pay Lessor for use of the
leased premises the sum of $1,600.00 per month in lawful money of
the United States of America on the first day of each month during
the term of this Lease, beginning October 1, 1989 and run through
and including September 1, 1994. On any payment due hereunder
which is not made on the due date thereof or within ten (10) days
thereafter, Lessee agrees to pay a late charge of five percent (5%)
of the unpaid amount of such installment to cover the additional
expense of handling such delinquent payment or payments. Said late
charges shall be paid with and in addition to the delinquent amount
of the payment on which charged when made and as a condition to
Lessor accepting such late payments.
5. Milk Assignment. Lessee agrees, concurrent herewith, to
execute and deliver to Lessor an assignment of One Thousand Six
Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) each month from the proceeds of
Lessee's sale of milk to WDCI. Said assignment shall begin with
the milk check payable to Lessee on October 1, 1989 and shall be
maintained and retained in full force and effect without
modification as to date, amount or otherwise until all
consideration payable under this Lease has been paid in full and
Lessee has complied with all terms, provisions and conditions of
this Lease.
6. Care and Maintenance. Lessee agrees to care for and to
maintain the improvements constituting a part of the leased
premises and all equipment constituting a part of the leased
premises in their condition as at the beginning of this Lease,
reasonable wear excepted. Lessee covenants and agrees to promptly
repair in a workmanlike manner all damage to improvements and all
equipment constituting a part of the leased premises at Lessee's
sole cost and expense.
7. Payment of Utilities. All culinary water and electricity
used on and in connection with Lessee's use of the leased premises
shall be separately metered and shall be paid for by Lessee
promptly when due.
8. Continuous Occupancy Required.
Subject only to the
conditions provided in paragraph 10 herein, Lessee shall not leave
the leased premises unoccupied or vacant but shall continuously,
during the entire term of this Lease, conduct and carry on only the
type of business with and on the leased premises specifically set
forth in paragraph 3 of this Lease.
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9. Real Property Taxes and Insurance. Lessor shall pay the
real property taxes on the leased premises during the term of this
Agreement, In addition, Lessor shall provide and pay the premium
for fire and general hazard insurance on improvements constituting
a part of the leased premises and shall be the sole beneficiary of
such insurance.
Lessee shall be responsible for obtaining and
paying for fire and general hazard insurance on the Cows, any feed
of Lessee kept on the leased premises, and any and all personal
property of Lessee kept on the leased premises. Lessee shall,
during the term of this Lease, carry public liability insurance
covering the leased premises with single limits of not less than
Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00) for injury and/or
death to persons and damage to property in companies licensed to
do business in the State of Utah rated "A" or better, Class X by
Best Key Rating Guide or any like rating service, pay the premiums
therefor, and deliver certificates of such insurance to Lessor from
time to time during the term of this Lease. Lessor shall be named
as an additional named insured on such policy.
The failure of
Lessee to procure such insurance and pay the requisite premiums
therefor, to name Lessor as an insured party thereon, or to deliver
said policies or certificates or duplicates to Lessor, shall
authorize, but not require Lessor to procure such insurance and
pay the requisite premiums therefor, which premiums shall be
repayable to Lessor with the next installment of rent.
Each
insurer under the policies required hereunder shall agree by
endorsement on the policy issued by it or by independent instrument
furnished to Lessor that it will give Lessor no less than thirty
(30) days written notice before the policy in question shall be
altered or cancelled.
10. Manure Removal. The parties shall cooperate in manure
removal from the leased premises.
Such removal shall be
accomplished by Lessee or his agents at the times and in the manner
directed by Lessor.
All manure produced by the Cows shall be
applied to land owned by Lessor unless Lessor otherwise directs.
11. Abatement of Consideration. In the event any buildings
constituting a part of the leased premises are destroyed or damaged
as a result of causes other than acts or neglect of Lessee and such
damage or destruction results in a diminution in but not a complete
inability of Lessee's ability to conduct a Grade A Dairy operation
with not less than 180 Cows on the leased premises, the monthly
consideration for this Lease shall be reduced by an amount
proportionate to the reduction in Lessee's cow herd below 180 Cows
as compared with 180 Cows for the period between such damage or
destruction and the time the same are repaired or replaced. Lessor
shall be responsible for repairing and/or replacing such damaged
or destroyed buildings. If all buildings constituting a part of
the leased premises are completely destroyed as a result of causes
other than acts or neglect of Lessee to the point where Lessee
cannot conduct a Grade H A H dairy on the leased premises, then
either party may, on written notice to the other within ten (10)
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days after such destruction, terminate this Lease, and in the event
such notice is given, both parties shall be released from all
obligations hereunder, except obligations accrued to the date of
such destructionHowever, Lessee's obligation on the Contract
shall continue in full force and effect and shall in no way be
modified or affected by any destruction.
If no such notice is
given, the destroyed premises shall be rebuilt by Lessor as
expeditiously as possible. Rentals herein provided shall abate
until the destroyed improvements are rebuilt and shall thereupon
resume for the unexpired portion of the term of this Lease. Under
no circumstances shall this Lease be modified in any way if damage
to or destruction of any such buildings result from the acts or
neglect of Lessee, his agents or employees.
12. Default on the Contract. A default on the Contract shall
constitute a default on this Lease and shall make available to
Lessor all remedies on default provided in the Contract and in this
Lease.
13. Payment of Expenses. Lessee agrees to furnish all labor
and to pay expenses of every kind and nature for the operation and
maintenance of the leased premises and for the conducting of
Lessee's operations thereon.
14. Assignment. Lessee shall not assign this Lease or any
of his right or interest herein or sub-lease any part of the leased
premises for any purpose whatever without the prior written consent
of Lessor.
Any assignment or sub-letting by Lessee without
Lessor's consent shall be null and void and shall constitute a
breach of this Lease by Lessee.
15. Surrender of Possession.
Lessee will surrender
possession of the leased premises on July 31, 1994, and that any
holding over thereafter shall be construed to be a tenancy at will.
16. Financing Statement.
Lessee agrees to execute and
deliver one or more financing 'statements, supplements thereto and
extensions thereof or other instruments as Lessor may from time to
time require to comply with the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, or
other applicable law to preserve, protect, and enforce the security
interest of the Lessor in said leased premises, and Lessee agrees

to pay all

costs

of filing

such statement,

supplements,

extensions

or instruments.
17. Default and Remedies. The Lessee shall be in default on
this Lease upon the happening of one or more of the following
events:
(a) Failure to pay an installment of rent or any
other sums to be paid by Lessee hereunder when due or
within ten (10) days thereafter;
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(b) Failure to perform
condition of this Lease;

any

terra, provision

or

(c) A petition under any provision of bankruptcy
law is filed against or by Lessee, or an assignment is
made by Lessee for the benefit of Lessee's creditors, or
a receiver is appointed of any assets covered by this
Lease and/or by the Contract;
(d) Failure of Lessee to perform any terra, provision
or condition of the Contract.
Upon default by the Lessee, Lessor may elect to terminate this
Lease or without terminating this Lease Lessor may take possession
of the leased premises and relet the same or any part thereof for
such term or terms and at such rental or rentals and upon such
other terms and conditions as Lessor, in the exercise of Lessor's
sole discretion, may deem advisable, and shall have the right to
make alterations and repairs to said leased premises. Upon each
such reletting, Lessee shall be immediately liable for and shall
pay to Lessor any indebtedness then due hereunder, the costs and
expenses of such reletting, (including advertising costs) brokerage
fees and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Lessor, the cost
of alterations and repairs incurred by Lessor, and the amount of
any rent accrued under this Lease for the period up to the time of
reletting and thereafter to the end of the term of this Lease, less
the rent actually received from reletting the leased premises. If
Lessee has been credited with any rent to be received by such
reletting and such rents shall not be promptly paid to Lessor by
the new Lessee, such deficiency shall be calculated and paid
monthly by Lessee.
The foregoing remedy is not exclusive, and
Lessor shall have as remedies cumulative to those provided above
any and all remedies against Lessee provided by the laws of the
State of Utah.
18. Improvements.
Any improvements placed on the leased
premises by Lessee during the term of this Lease shall revert to
and become the property of Lessor at the termination of this Lease,
free and clear of any claim by Lessee and without the payment by
Lessor of any consideration therefor.
19. Attorney's Fees and Costs. That should either of the
parties default in any of the covenants or agreements contained
herein, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
including a reasonable attorney's fee which may arise or accrue
from enforcing this Agreement or in obtaining possession of the
leased premises or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by
the laws of the State of Utah, whether such remedy is pursued by
filing of suit or otherwise.
20. Notices. Any notice required hereunder or which may be
required in pursuing any remedy given by the laws of the State of
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Utah to the parties hereto shall be deemed sufficient if given by
registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as
follows:
To Lessor:

107 West 200 South
Newton, Utah 84327

To Lessee:

1736 North 1850 East
North Logan, Utah 84321

Said addresses may be changed at any time by giving written notice
to the other party.
21. Right of Entry. Lessor reserves the right to themselves,
their agents, their employees, or their assigns, to enter the
leased premises at any reasonable time for purposes (a) of
consultation with Lessee; (b) of making repairs and improvements;
and (3) of inspections of the leased premises.
22. Compliance With Law and Insurance Limitations. Lessee
agrees in his occupancy and use of the leased premises to comply
with all applicable rules, regulations, allotments or other
conditions imposed by federal, state, county or municipal
authority, and will conduct his operations on the leased premises
in accordance therewith. Lessee agrees to hold Lessor free from
all liability, cost or expenses of any kind that may be incurred
by reason of Lessee's failure or neglect so to do. In addition,
Lessee agrees to comply with all rules, conditions and limitations
in his use and occupancy of the leased premises imposed by the
terms, provisions and conditions of fire and general hazard
insurance policies obtained by Lessor on any improvements
constituting a part of the leased premises.
23. Indemnification. Lessee agrees to indemnify Lessor and
hold Lessor harmless from loss, damages, demands and claims of
every kind for injuries to or death of persons and from injury or
damage to property arising from or upon the leased premises. The
amount of this indemnification shall not be limited to the
liability insurance limits provided in paragraph 8 of this Lease,
but Lessee shall be liable under this provision for all claims
herein indemnified against, whether or not greater than or covered
by the coverage provisions by such liability insurance.
Lessee
expressly agrees that indemnification under this provision shall
include all investigation, defense and other costs and all
attorney's fees incurred by Lessor in enforcing this provision and
in defending themselves against any and all claims against which
Lessors are indemnified under and pursuant to this provision.
24. Multiple Parties. As used in this Lease, the terra Lessor
shall include all Lessors, whether one or more; and the masculine
shall include the feminine and the feminine the masculine when the
context so requires.
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25. Applicable Law and Venue. This Lease shall be governed
and construed under and according to the laws of the State of Utah.
All actions to enforce or construe this Lease shall be brought and
maintained in the District Court of Cache County, Utah, and in no
other court, and all parties expressly consent to and submit
themselves to the venue and jurisdiction of said Court.
26. Parties Bound. The terms of this Lease shall be binding
upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, their
respective heirs, executors, administrators, successors, trustees
and permitted assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their hands
on the day and year first above written.

Delores S. Jones
LESSOR

VWJUSL V. Q U ^ ^ S L ^
Michael J.

Witness

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Cache

)

Ar

ss

On the 21st day of August, 1989, personally appeared before
me NORVAL R. JONES, DELORES S. JONES and MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL, the
signers of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that
the\y executed the same.

s*?*&L,jtA

^C-^^<

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
Logarn^yjferah
,
Commission E x p i r e s :
b/15/91

LBH/1
jones.lea

•^r

Contract

Plaintiff s
Exhibit 2

CONTRACT OF SALE
THIS CONTRACT, made and entered into this 21st day of August,
1989, by and between NORVAL R. JONES and DELORES S. JONES of
Newton, Cache County, Utah, hereinafter referred to as Seller, and
MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL of North Logan, Cache County, Utah, hereinafter
referred to as Buyer.
WITNESSETH:
1. Property Sold. For the consideration and on the terms and
conditions herein set forth, the Seller agrees to sell and the
Buyer agrees to purchase the following described property:
One Hundred Eighty (180) head of Holstein Milk Cows (-the
Cows")
6900 pounds of Grade A Milk Base ( Mthe Base") in Western
Dairymans Cooperative, Inc. (HWDCI")
2. Herd Size.
It Is understood that the Cows constitute
all
of Seller's herd of milking cows, including milking and dry cows,
and that in the event there are insufficient Cows on the date of
possession hereinafter provided to make a total of One Hundred
Eighty (180) Holstein Milk Cows, Seller will on the date of
possession provide sufficient "springing" heifers from Seller's
non-milking herd, of Buyer's choice, to bring the total number of
Cows to One Hundred Eighty (180) head on the date of possession.
3. Branding, Identification and Maintaining of Herd Numbers.
The Cows shall be branded with a
on the right hip on or
before the date of closing. Buyer agrees to maintain a herd of not
less than One Hundred Eighty (180) Holstein Milk Cows, milking and
dry, at all times during the term of this Contract. As the Cows
delivered to Buyer on the date of possession die or are culled and
sold, Buyer agrees to replace each cow which dies or is culled and
sold with a Holstein cow or springing Holstein heifer ( -Replacement
Cows") of comparable quality to the one replaced. Each Replacement
Cow shall immediately be branded with the above-described brand in
the above-described body location. Title to all Replacement Cows
shall vest in Seller as security for Buyer's performance of all
terms, provisions and conditions of this Contract.
Until this
Contract is fully performed by Buyer, Seller shall have and is
hereby granted a security interest in all Cows and all Replacement
Cows to secure Buyer's performance of all terms, provisions and
conditions of this Contract.
4. Liens and Encumbrances. Seller warrants and represents
that the Cows are free of all liens and encumbrances. Buyer agrees
that he will not place or allow the placement of any liens or
encumbrances against the Cows or the Replacement Cows or against
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title thereto until after Buyer has performed as herein provided
all terms, provisions and conditions of this Contract.
All
Replacement Cows shall be paid for in full when purchased or
otherwise acquired by Buyer and used as such replacements, and
Replacement Cows shall be and remain free and clear of all liens
and encumbrances until after Buyer has performed as herein provided
all terms, provisions and conditions of this Contract.
5. Purchase Price, Allocation and Payment.
The purchase
price is Two Hundred Seven Thousand Six Hundred Dollars
($207,600.00). The purchase price shall be and is allocated as
follows:
To the Cows
To the Base

$180,000.00
$ 27,600.00

Buyer agrees to pay the purchase price to Seller or the order of
Seller in writing at the residence of Seller at 107 West 200 South,
Newton, Utah 84327, or at such other place as Seller may designate
in writing, in lawful money of the United States of America, as
follows:
(a) $4,750.00 on October 15, 1989, and $4,750.00 on
the 15th day of each month thereafter until the entire
purchase price, together with interest as hereinafter
provided, is paid in full.
(b) On any payment due hereunder which is not made
on the due date thereof or within ten (10) days
thereafter, the Buyer agrees to pay a late charge of five
percent (5%) of the unpaid amount of such installment to
cover the additional expense of handling such delinquent
payment or payments. Said late charges shall be and aire
secured by the security interest in the Cows, Replacement
Cows and Base granted by this Contract and shall be paid
with and in addition to the delinquent amount of the
payment on which charged when made and as a condition to
Seller accepting such late payments.
6. Interest. Seller agrees to pay interest on all unpaid
principal portions of the purchase price from September 1, 1989 at
the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum. Each payment made by
Buyer shall be applied as follows: First to late charges, if any,
second to interest accrued to the date of receipt of payment by
Seller, and third to principal. Buyer may not prepay any part of
the purchase price or interest thereon without the prior written
consent of Seller and then only on such terms and conditions as
Seller may specify in writing in advance of any permitted payment.
7. Milk Assignment. Buyer agrees, concurrent herewith, to
execute and deliver to Seller an assignment of Four Thousand Seven
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($4,750.00) each month from the proceeds of
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Buyer's sale of milk to WDCI. Said assignment shall begin with the
milk check payable to Buyer on October 15, 1989 and shall be
maintained and retained in full force and effect without
modification as to date, amount or otherwise until all
consideration payable under this Contract has been paid in full and
Buyer has complied with all terms, provisions and conditions of
this Contract.
8. Place of Keeping. The Cows and all Replacement Cows shall
at all times until this Contract is completed be kept on the
premises commonly known as 107 West 200 South in Newtonf Utah.
None of the Cows or Replacement Cows shall be removed from the
above location except when dead or removed for purposes of culling
or sale with Seller's permission as hereinafter provided.
9. Culling and Sale. Buyer shall have the right to cull and
sell any of the Cows and Replacement Cows on the following express
conditions:
(a) Buyer shall first seek and obtain the written
consent of Seller to the culling and sale of each Cow and
Replacement Cow.
(b) The full proceeds from sale of any Cow and
Replacement Cow and any from the sale of any cow carcass
sold shall be paid to Seller and shall be applied on the
purchase price in the manner provided in paragraph 6
above, unless Seller otherwise agrees in writing. The
proceeds so paid and applied shall be additional payments
to those provided in paragraph 5(a) herein and not as a
part of or in lieu of any such payment.
(c) Concurrent with the execution and delivery of
this Contract, Buyer agrees to execute, acknowledge and
deliver to Seller an Assignment from the proceeds of
Buyer's sale of milk to WDCI of sums sufficient to pay
the monthly payments to Seller provided in this Contract
and in the Lease. Such Assignment shall be irrevocable
and shall take precedence over all other such assignments
until this Contract has been fully performed by Buyer.
The making and giving of such Assignment shall not
constitute payment by Buyer on this Contract or on the
Lease, and no credits for payments shall be given by
Seller until actually received by Seller.
Said
Assignment shall in no way release or modify Buyer's
obligation to make the payments herein provided promptly
and in the amounts provided, and if sums from such
Assignment are insufficient to pay each payment herein
and in the Lease when due, Buyer shall be and remain
fully responsible for and shall pay any deficiency when
due.
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Seller specifically agrees to allow Buyer to use the proceeds from
the sale of all Cows and Replacement Cows culled, sold, and the
proceeds from sale of all cow carcasses to apply toward purchase
of Replacement Cows.
If sale proceeds are so used by Buyer, no
amounts so used by Buyer shall be applied toward payment of the
purchase price.
10. Security in Base.
Notwithstanding the assignment
provided in paragraph 12 herein, Seller shall have and hereby
retains a security interest in the Base and in all increase thereon
which may accrue during the term of this Contract to secure Buyer's
timely performance of all terms, provisions and conditions of this
Contract. Buyer agrees to increase the number of cows he milks in
conjunction with the Cows sold hereunder to a total, including the
180 Cows sold hereunder, of 210 adult, milking cows or "springing
heifers H not later than September 1, 1990* Buyer's failure so to
do shall not constitute a default under this Contract. However,
in the event Buyer complies with this provision, then (1) upon
Buyer providing Seller with evidence satisfactory to Seller that
title to the additional 30 head of cows or springing heifers is
free and clear of all encumbrances, (2) upon Buyer's execution and
delivery to Seller of a UCC-1 (Financing Statement on said
additional 30 head of cows or springing heifers), and (3) provided
doing so will not reduce the number of pounds of WDCI Grade A Milk
Base which Seller is selling hereunder below 6900 pounds, Seller
agrees to release their lien and security interest against the Base
and to accept the security interest in said 30 additional head of
cows or springing heifers as substitute security for the Base. If
any of the conditions (1), (2) or (3) in this paragraph 10 fail,
this provision for substitution of security of 30 head of cows or
springing heifers for the Base shall be inoperative, and Seller
shall retain a security interest in the Base pursuant to this
paragraph 10 until the purchase price is paid in full and Buyer has
complied with all terms, provisions and conditions of this
Contract.
11. Financing Statement. Buyer agrees to execute and deliver
one or more financing statements, supplements thereto and
extensions thereof or other instruments as Seller may from time to
time require to comply with the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, or
other applicable law to preserve, protect, and enforce the security
interest of the Seller in said personal property, and Buyer agrees
to pay all costs of filing such statement, supplements, extensions
or instruments.
12. Assignment. Concurrent with the execution and delivery
of this Contract, Seller agrees to assign to Buyer all of Seller's
interest in the Base, subject to the security interest provided in
paragraph 10 above. Said assignment shall be recorded with WDCI,
and WDCI shall be informed of Seller's retained security interest
in the Base. Buyer covenants and agrees that he will not assign
or in any way encumber the Base until after this Contract has been
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fully performed strictly within the terms and conditions of this
Contract.
13. Conveyance. Upon payment in full of the purchase price
and Buyer's compliance with all terms, provisions and conditions
of this Contract, Seller agrees (1) to convey title to the Cows
and Replacement Cows to Buyer by Bill of Sale; and (2) to terminate
with the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code any and
all financing statements filed pursuant to paragraph 11 of this
Contract. Title to the Cows and Replacement Cows shall be conveyed
free and clear of all liens, defects and encumbrances, except such
liens, defects and encumbrances as might accrue against the Cows
and Replacement Cows or against title thereto by reason of the acts
or neglect of the Buyer.
14. Care and Maintenance of Cows. From and after the date
possession of the Cows is delivered to Buyer, Buyer shall assume
and bear all risk of loss, disease, injury and death of and to the
Cows and Replacement Cows. Buyer agrees to feed, care for and
maintain the Cows and Replacement Cows in the same condition of
health as when possession is delivered to Buyer and to provide and
pay for all vaccination, dehorning, care and treatment of and for
the Cows and Replacement Cows, including but not limited to payment
of all medicine and veterinary fees and charges for care
(preventive and corrective) and treatment of the Cows and
Replacement Cows. In addition, Buyer agrees to breed the Cows in
a timely manner so as to insure that each Cow bears a calf each
year unless the Cow is barren or for a reason beyond the control
of Buyer fails to conceive a calf. Buyer agrees to maintain good
and sufficient record and accounts of all Cows and Replacement Cows
and the milk production and offspring thereof, which will be
available for inspection by Seller at any reasonable time. Buyer
agrees to obey all laws and regulations pertaining to the
ownership, possession and use of the Cows and Replacement Cows and
particularly those laws pertaining to health, quarantine, herding,
grazing, trespass, branding inspection, movement and transportation
of livestock and that the marks or brands on the Cows and
Replacement Cows shall not be altered or mutilated in any respect.
In addition, Buyer agrees to comply with all rules and regulations
of WDCI and to at all times during this Contract maintain not less
than 6900 pounds of Grade A Milk Base with WDCI.
15. Increase. Provided Buyer complies with the provisions
of paragraph 3 of this Contract, all increase of and from the Cows
and Replacement Cows shall be the property of Buyer. In the event
Buyer defaults on this Contract, from and after the date of such
default, all increase of and from the Cows and Replacement Cows
which are born from and after the date of such default shall be and
remain the property of Seller and shall be covered by and included
as a part of the security interest retained by Seller in the Cows
and Replacement Cows as fully as though and to the same extent as
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if such security interest had attached to such increase at the
inception of this Contract.
16. Taxes.
The sale and purchase represented by this
Contract is believed by all parties hereto to be exempt from Utah
Sales Tax. However, should any sales or use tax be assessed upon
or as a result of the sale represented by this Contract, all such
taxes shall be paid by Buyer. Any personal property taxes levied
against the Cows and Replacement Cows during the time this Contract
remains in effect shall be paid by Buyer. Any personal property
taxes assessed against the Cows and Replacement Cows for the
calendar year 1989 shall be prorated to August 1, 1989. Seller
shall pay seven-twelfths (7/12) of such tax and Buyer five-twelfths
(5/12) of such tax. Each shall pay their pro rata part of such
personal property tax on or before the due date for payment
thereof.
17. Concurrent Lease.
Concurrent with the execution and
delivery of this Contract, the Seller as Lessor and Buyer as Lessee
will enter into a written Lease ("the Lease-) of property and
improvements in Newton, Utah whereon the Cows are presently being
housed and kept. The Lease is an integral part of this transaction
whereby the Cows and the Base are being sold to Buyer.
It is,
therefore, expressly understood and agreed that any default on the
Lease will constitute a default on this Contract, and any such
default on the Lease shall make available to Seller all remedies
on default provided in this Contract as well as and in addition to
all remedies provided in the Lease upon default by the Lessee.
18. Inspection and Cure of Default. Seller may at all times
enter upon the premises where any of the Cows and Replacement Cows
may be found to inspect the same and, in Seller's sole discretion,
correct any default of Buyer, and Seller may make such expenditures
as Seller considers necessary or appropriate to correct any such
default, whether for payment of taxes or for the care and
protection of the Cows and Replacement Cows or of the security
interest of Seller, or otherwise. Buyer, upon demand of Seller,
will repay to Seller the amount of such expenditures, together with
interest thereon at the rate of 15% per annum and all costs and
attorney's fees, and if not paid, said amount will be secured
hereby.
19. Default. Buyer shall be in default hereunder if any of
the following events occur: (a) Seller fails to make payments when
due on any obligation secured hereby; (b) Seller fails to perform
any other obligation hereunder when the same is to be performed;
(c) any statement, representation or warranty of Buyer herein or
in any other writing at any time furnished by Buyer to Seller is
untrue in any material respect as of the date made; (d) Buyer
becomes insolvent or unable to pay debts as they mature or makes
an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or any proceeding is
instituted by or against the Buyer alleging that such Buyer is
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insolvent or unable to pay debts as they mature; (e) entry of any
judgment against Buyer; (f) death of Buyer; (g) the issuing of an
attachment or garnishment, or the filing of a lien against the
Cows, Replacement Cows and/or the Base; (h) the assignment by Buyer
of any interest in the Cows, Replacement Cows and/or the Base
without the written consent of Seller; (i) the breach by Buyer of
any terms, provisions or conditions of the Lease.
20. Remedies. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder
and at any time thereafter, Seller may declare immediately due and
payable all amounts secured hereby, and shall have the cumulative
remedies of a secured party under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code
and other applicable law, and: (a) Seller shall have the right to
enter upon any premises where the Cows and Replacement Cows may be,
and take possession thereof; and Buyer shall, if requested by
Seller, assemble the Cows and Replacement Cows at a place
designated by Seller; and Seller may sell, lease or otherwise
dispose of the Cows and Replacement Cows in accordance with law,
and after deducting all expenses for repossessing, maintaining,
caring for, treating, transporting and disposing of the collateral
and all attorney's fees, legal or other expenses in connection
therewith, to apply the residue of the proceeds of such sale or
sales to pay (or to hold as a reserve against) all obligations of
Buyer secured hereby; and (b) Seller may obtain the appointment of
a receiver, with or without notice to Buyer, for the purpose of
possessing, managing and selling the Cows, Replacement Cows and the
Base pursuant to this Contract; and (c) Seller may collect from
Buyer all amounts remaining due after application of the proceeds
as above provided.
The remedies herein are cumulative and not
alternative, and Buyer shall have all remedies provided by the laws
of the State of Utah in addition to those expressly provided above.
Seller shall have given Buyer reasonable notice of any sale or
other disposition of the collateral if notice is mailed postage
prepaid, addressed to Buyer at the address set forth herein at
least five (5) days before the time of the sale or disposition.
21. Additional Purchase. At the time of closing, the parties
shall inventory all beet pulp, grain, whole cotton seed, brewer's
pellets and haylage, and Buyer agrees to pay Seller the fair market
value of all said enumerated feed in lawful money of the United
States of America on the date of possession in addition to the
purchase price herein provided. In addition, if any of the alfalfa
hay of Seller stored in the hay barns described in the Lease as of
the date of possession is of acceptable quality to Buyer, Buyer
agrees to purchase from and pay to Seller the fair market value of
such acceptable hay on the date of possession in lawful money of
the United States of America, in addition to the purchase price
herein provided.
22. Property Retained. It is understood that the sale and
purchase represented by this Contract does not include any of
Seller's Hyoung stock", all of which young stock will be retained
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by Seller.
It Xb luxther understood that the pxopei ty and
facilities whereon Seller's "young stockn is presently housed and
where feed for such "young stockM is presently being stored is not
a part of either this Contract or of the Lease, and title to and
possession of all such property and facilities, together with
ingress and egress thereto, is expressly retained by the Seller,
In addition, Seller retains and shall be entitled to ownership and
receipt of all patronage dividends, retained earnings and
dividends, capital rotation and other benefits granted and/or paid
by WDCI for milk sold by Seller to WDCI through August 31, 1989.
23. Attorney's Fees and Costs. Should either party default
xn any of the covenants or agreements contained in this Contract,
the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including
a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from
enforcing this Contract or in obtaining possession of the property
hereunder or in pursuing any remedy provided for by the laws of the
State of Utahr whether such remedy in pursued by filing a suit or
otherwise.
24. Paragraph Headings.
The paragraph headings of this
Contract are inserted only for convenience and in no way define,
limit or describe the scope or intent of this Contract nor affect
its terms and provisions.
25. Binding Effect. This Contract shall be binding upon and
inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, their respective heirs,
executors, administrators, successors, trustees and assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, these presents are executed the day and
year first above written.

Norval R. Jone^V

e-Af^r 3~
Delores S• Jones
SELLER
n

v

\%^^scA^X^

Witness

Michael J . Arami^L
BUYER

LBH/1
jones.con
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR Tllf COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

NORVALR JONES and
DELORES S. JONES

MEMORANDUM DECISION

MNIII

CIVIL NO. 930000077
is

HONORABLE BEN II HADFIELD
l\\( 11 VI L I

UlAMIil
DEFENDANT.

This matter was tried to the Court on July /, 1994. At the conclusion of the tiial (lie
Court announced partial fmdings and decision and directed Counsel to conduct further
research and submit written memoranda of points and authorities Plaintiffs Memorandum
was submitted October 18, 1994. Defendant's Memorandum was submitted January 3, 1995.
Both memoranda were substantially beyond the deadlines set by the Court. The Court will
accept both memoranda and has reviewed the same, but notes that the passage of time
compounds the difficulty in making a precise calculation concerning the issues.
As previously indicated, the Court finds that the August 21, 1989 Lease is valid and
enforceable and was never modified by the parties. The Court further finds that paragraph
17 of the Lease empowers the Plaintiff to relet the premises if the Defendant is in default.
Plaintiff testified he referred several inquiries concerning the property to the Defendant.
Defendant testified that in November 1991, Plaintiff stated that because of difficulties and
damages, he would "never relet the place again." The Court finds that Defendant's failure to
pay the $1600.00 monthly rental constituted a breach of the Lease and commenced in July
1992. Thereafter, it became incumbent upon the Plaintiff to mitigate his damages. The
Court finds that the Plaintiff failed to take adequate steps to mitigate damages after July 1,

•/.5 • ' ' y
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1993. Ihe Court will allow the rent to accrue tor the one year period tor the initial breach
and finds that such a period of time would have been reasonable for the Plaintiff to seek
othei ienters or find alternate ways of mitigating damages. Therefore, the Court finds that
rent is due and owing for the period of July 1, 1992 through June 30, 1993 in the amount of
$19,200 00
During the period of July 1992 through June 30, 1993, the Plaintiff did take certain
measures to mitigate damages and these shall be allowed as offsets as follows:
Plaintiffs use of the coral
Plaintiffs use of hay barn
Plaintiffs sale of home
in May 1993
Total Mitigation Offset:

$ 1,400.00
2,000.00
225.00

Total rent owing from Defendant
to Plaintiff after mitigation offset

$15,550.00

$ 3,650.00

I he Court has reviewed the property damage claims of Plaintiff including the
exhibits. During the term of the Lease, the facilities were already rather old and equipim iil
"well worn". On the other hand, the exhibits leave little doubt that significant damage
occurred during the period of Defendant's occupancy. Many of the damages claimed by
Plaintiff would leave the Plaintiff with new equipment, whereas, the equipment at the
commencement of the Lease was far from new.
After reviewing the exhibits and evidence, the Court awards property damages in
favor of the Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $5,980.00.

Memorandum Decision
Case #930000077
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The Defendant having breached the Lease, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys
fees incurred herein. Judgment is awarded against Defendants in the amount of $5,305.23
for attorneys fees, and costs, together with such reasonable fees and costs as are hereafter
documented from the date of trial until the Judgment is ultimately satisfied.
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare comprehensive Findings and
Conclusions as well as a Judgment in accordance with this decision.

DATHUfiiN

JLJ day of February, IW.V

BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on the 22nd

day of

February

, 1995,

sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the attached document
o the following:
Gregory Skabelund
2176 North Main
Logan, ITT 84 341

L. Brent tioggan
OLSON & HOGGAN
88 West Center
P. 0. Box 525
Logan, UT 84323-0525

District Court Clerk

/ .

By. /f>/7^y.VL^Vfew/
Katthi J o h n s t o n ,
Deputy Clerk

L. Brent Hoggan (#1512)
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
88 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
Telephone (801) 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
NORVAL R. JONES and DELORES
S. JONES,
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL,

Case No.
Defendant.

930 0 0Of)' ' ' <M

This matter came on for trial pursuant to notice at

9:00

o'clock a.m. July 7, 1994 in the Courtroom in the Hall of Justice,
Logan, Cache County, Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding.
The Plaintiffs were present in person and were represented by their
attorneys, Olson & Hoggan, P . C , L. Brent Hoggan

The Defendant

was present in person and was represented by his attorney, Gregory
Skabelund.

Witnesses

were

sworn

and

testified,

documentary

evidence was presented, the case was argued and briefed to the
Court and the Court having heard the evidence, having examined the
SON & HOGGAN, P.C.

Memorandum of the parties and being fully advised in the premises,

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
88 WEST CENTER

now makes and enters the following:

P.O. BOX 525
-SAN. UTAH 8 4 3 2 3 0 5 2 5
<80t) 752-1551

FINDINGS OF FACT:

TREMONTON OFFICE:

1.

123 EAST MAIN
P.O. BOX 1 15
MONTON. UTAH 84337

Under date of July 21, 1989 the Plaintiffs as Lessor

entered into a written Lease with the Defendant as Lessee covering

<801) 2 5 7 3 8 8 5
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2
premises consisting of land, a milking parlor, milking equipment,
two

(2) hay sheds, milk cow lounging sheds, corrals, a silo, a I

commodity shed, a tenant house and various items of farm machinery j
and equipment.

Said property will be referred to hereinafter as

the Leased Premises.
2.

The term of the Lease was for five

(5) years beginning

September 1, 1989 and terminating at midnight on August 31, 1994. i
3.

By the terms of the Lease, the Defendant agreed to pay

Plaintiff monthly rental of $1,600.00 each month beginning Octoberj
1, 1989 and continuing on the 1st day of each month thereafter
through and including September 1, 1994.
4.

Under the terms of the Lease, on any payment which was due

which was not made on the due date or within

five

(5) days

thereafter, Lessee agreed to pay a late charge of five percent (5%)
of the unpaid amount of such installment.
5.

I

Under the terms of the Lease, the Defendant agreed to care

for and maintain the improvements constituting part of the Leased
Premises and all equipment

constituting

a part of

the Leased

Premises in their condition as at the beginning of the Lease,
reasonable wear and tear accepted.

Defendant further covenanted

under the terms of the Lease to promptly repair in a workmanlike
manner all damage to improvements and all equipment constituting a
part of the Lease Premises at Defendant's sole cost and expense.
6.
and

was

The Court finds that the Lease is valid and enforceable
never

terminated

or

modified

by

the

parties

either

specifically or by a course of dealing between Plaintiffs and
Defendant.
7.

The Defendant defaulted

in the Lease by, among other

things, failing to pay monthly rental payments thereon after July
1, 1992 and by failure to keep the improvements on the Leased
Premises in good order and by failure to care for and maintain the
improvements on the premises and by abandoning the Leased Premises
at or about the time Defendant ceased paying rental payments on the
Lease.

1(1

8.

The Plaintiffs, with the express consent of Defendant,

used one (1) of the corrals and the hay barn on the Leased Premise
subsequent to Defendant's vacating the same and sold the tenant
house.

The reasonable rental for the corral used by the Plaintiffs

was $1,400.00, the reasonable value of the use of the hay barn by
the Plaintiffs was $2,000.00 and interest earned by Plaintiffs on
the proceeds from the sale of the tenant house from the time sold
to the termination of the Lease is $225.00, making a total offset
to which Defendant would be entitled for sums owing by Defendant to
Plaintiffs under the Lease is $3,650.00.
9.

The

Court

finds

that

Plaintiffs

had

a

continuing

expectation that Defendant would return to and use the Leased
Premises and for this reason failed to relet the premises and
thereby

mitigate

their

damages.

The

Court

finds

that

this

expectation on the Plaintiffs' part was reasonable but not for a
period exceeding one (1) year from the date of the initial breach.
Thereafter, the Court finds that it would have been reasonable for
Plaintiffs to seek other renters or to find alternate ways of
mitigating their damages.
10.

Based upon the foregoing findings of the Court, the Court

determines that the rentals due under the Lease for a period of one
(1) year after Defendant stopped making rental payments is the sum
of $19,200.00 plus interest at ten percent (10%) from the date due
until paid and late charges.

Interest accrued to April 1, 1995

totals $4,239.94 and late charges total $960.00.
11.

The Court finds that notwithstanding Plaintiffs' claim

that the damages to the Leased Premises caused by or as a result of
the Defendant's unreasonable use of the same totaled $8,263.00, the
SON & HOGGAN, P C

actual

sum

of

the

claims

were

for

replacement

costs

of

old

ATTORNEYS AT LJ\W
8 8 WEST CENTER

P O BOX 525
OGAN UTAH 84323-0525
<801) 752 1 551

TREMONTON OFFICE

equipment and that under the circumstances, reasonable compensation
for improvements damaged by the Defendant on the Leased Premises is
$5,980.00 plus interest thereon from July 1, 1992 at the rate of
ten percent (10%) per annum

Interest accrued to April 1, 1995 is

123 EAST MAIN
P O BOX 1 1 5

$1,644.49.

REMONTON UTAH 84337
(801) 257 3885

( /
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12.

The Court finds that the Lease provides f or the recovery

of attorney's fees in the event of a default.

The Court further

finds that the Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this action
and determines that a reasonable attorney's fee for the period
through the trial of this case is $5,305.23.
13.

The Court further finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to

their costs upon filing an appropriate cost bond and, further, are
entitled

reasonable

fees

and

costs

hereafter

incurred

and

documented until ultimate satisfaction of this Court's judgment.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1.

That Judgment should enter in favor of Plaintiffs and

against Defendant for rentals due and unpaid in the amount of
$19,200.00 plus late charges of $960.00 and interest to April 1,
1995 in the amount of $4,239.94 or a total of $24,299.94 less
mitigation of $3,650.00 for Plaintiffs' use of the corral barn and
for the sale of the tenant house

for a net

amount

of

lease

payments, interest and late charges of $20,749.94.
2.

Judgment should enter against Defendant for damages to the

Leased Premises in the amount of $5,980.00 plus interest thereon to
April 1, 1995 in the amount of $1,644.49.
3.

Judgment should be in favor of Plaintiffs and against

Defendant for $5,305.23 in attorney's fees through the trial of
this case plus their costs and that judgment should provide that
Plaintiffs are entitled to Judgment for such further costs and
attorney's fees as Plaintiffs may incur from and after the date of
Trial and until said Judgment is satisfied.
Let Judgment enter accordingly.

i \

DATED

this tH
day of A p r i l ,

19 95

tUL

Ben H. Hadfiely
District Court/ Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, to Defendant's Attorney,
Gregory Skabelund, at 2176 North Main, Logan, Utah 84321, postage
prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 29th day of March, 1995.

/fduJ^TAffl**"
L. Brent Hoggan

LBH/iones fof
N-4213
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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X5AN UTAH 84323-0525
(801) 752 1551
TREMONTON OFFICE
1 23 EAST MAIN
P O BOX 1 15
tEMONTON UTAH 84337
(801) 257 3885

//b

J. & Decree

; L. Brent Hoggan (#1512)
j! OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
j! Attorneys for Plaintiffs
ii 88 West Center
ij P.O. Box 525
|! Logan, Utah 84323-0525
;; Telephone (801) 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
NORVAL R. JONES and DELORES
! S. JONES,
i!

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

vs.
! MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL,
Case No.

930000077 CV

Defendant

This matter came on for trial pursuant to notice at 9:00
o'clock a.m. July 7, 1994 in the Courtroom in the Hall of Justice,
Logan, Cache County, Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding.
The Plaintiffs were present in person and were represented by their
attorneys, Olson & Hoggan, P . C , L. Brent Hoggan.

The Defendant

was present in person and was represented by his attorney, Gregory
Skabelund.

Witnesses

were

sworn

and testified,

documentary

evidence was presented, the case was argued and briefed to the
Court and the Court having heard the evidence, having examined the
-SON 8c H O G G A N . P.C
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
8 8 WEST CENTER
P O BOX 5 2 5
OGAN. UTAM

84323-0525

Memorandum of the parties and being fully advised in the premises,
and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law,

now makes and enters the following:

(801) 752-1551

TREMONTON OFFICE

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

1 2 3 EAST MAIN
P.O. BOX 1 15
REMONTON. UTAH 84337
(801) 257-3885

It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
i0flOFlLME:Dj

_
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1.

That

Judgment

be

and

is hereby

entered

in

favor of

Plaintiffs and against Defendant for rentals due and unpaid in the
amount of $19,200.00 plus late charges of $960.00 and interest to
April 1, 1995 in the amount of $4,239.94 or a total of $24,299.94
less mitigation of $3,650.00 for Plaintiffs' use of the corral barn
and for the sale of the tenant house for a net amount of lease
payments, interest and late charges of $20,749.94.
2.

Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiffs and

against Defendant for damages to the Leased Premises in the amount
of $5,980.00 plus interest thereon to April 1, 1995 in the amount
of $1,644.49.
3.

Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against

Defendant for $5,305.23 in attorney's fees through the trial of
this case plus their costs plus such further costs and attorney's
fees as Plaintiffs may incur from and after the date of Trial and
until said Judgment is satisfied.
Let Judgment enter accordingly.
DATED this

/<-/

day of April, 1995

Ben H. Hadfield
District Court Ju£lge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing
Judgment and Decree, to Defendant's Attorney, Gregory Skabelund, at
SON & HOGGAN P C

2176 North Main, Logan, Utah 84321, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah,

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
88 WEST CENTER

this 29th day of March, 1995.

P O BOX 525

/rj*£%for~

LOGAN UTAH 84323-0525
(801) 752 1551
TREMONTON OFFICE
1 23 EAST MAIN
P O BOX 1 1 5
TREMONTON UTAH 84337
(801) 257 3885

L. Brent Hoggan
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

NORVAL R. JONES and
DELORES S. JONES

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PLAINTIFFS,
CIVIL NO. 930000077
vs.

HONORABLE BEN H. HADFIELD

MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL,
DEFENDANT.

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant's Motion To Alter Or
Amend Judgment. The Court has reviewed the Motion, accompanying memorandum,
Plaintiffs reply memorandum and Defendant's response.
Defendant's first argument is that Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages and therefore
should be awarded no damages. Defendant's argument seems to totally overlook the
consequences of Defendant's undisputed breach. A duty to mitigate only arises if a breach
occurs. In the typical occurrence, a lessee defaults in rent, a lessor makes efforts to obtain
an alternate lessee, and within a reasonable period of time, that alternate lessee is making the
rental payments or a portion thereof, thereby mitigating the damages. The Court held in this
case, that reasonable mitigation efforts by Plaintiffs should have produced an alternate lessee
witon one year irom th£ bieath. Trie breach occurred M y \ , \9#1 Wnen I>eiendant iailei
to pay the rent owing.
The Court stands by its original decision concerning the mitigation issue. The
Judgment as prepared arid entered was, in the Court's view, the correct amount.
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Defendant's second point of alleged error claims it was improper to award "postjudgment interest". The argument following this assertion addresses the issue of "prejudgment interest". Presumably, Defendant's argument is directed to the issue of prejudgment interest. UCA 15-1-1 (2) provides an interest rate of 10% in circumstances such as
the present. Plaintiff was entitled to interest at this rate from the date each amount became
due and certain. The general prayer for relief in the Complaint is sufficient to cover the
issue of statutory interest.
The third error alleged by Defendant is that Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover
their attorneys fees because Plaintiffs had failed to mitigate damages. This argument
confiises two separate and distinct issues. The Plaintiffs were awarded attorneys fees due to
the Defendant's breach of the Contract. The Plaintiffs failure to mitigate was not, in itself, a
breach of the Contract, but rather was an occurrence which limited the amount of Plaintiffs'
recovery. The award of attorneys fees and costs is affirmed.
Defendants' Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment is denied in its entirety. Counsel
for Plaintiffs is directed to prepare an Order in conformance herewith.
jX
DATED this i T day ofJttfifcr, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on the

6th

day of

July

, 1995,

I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the attached document
to the following:
Brent Hoggan
Olson and Hoggan
88 West Center Street
P. 0, Box 525
Logan, UT 84323-0525

Gregory Skabelund
2176 North Main
Logan, UT 84321

District Court Clerk

By:

fifljAi^dsn^ljrf^

Kaujii J o h n s t o n ,
Deputy Clerk

